Russia launched more than 50 jet-powered drones at Ukraine during its overnight attack on Sept. 25–26, according to the Ukrainian Air Force, underscoring the role of faster aircraft in Moscow’s long-range strike campaign.

The jet-powered aircraft formed part of a reported total of 173 drones, including Shahed attack drones, Gerbera drones and Parodiya decoys. Ukrainian forces said they shot down or electronically suppressed 134, with impacts recorded at 19 locations and debris falling at eight others.

Kyiv faced a second consecutive day of attacks involving jet-powered drones. By 10 a.m. on Sept. 26, the capital had recorded five air raid alerts, according to the Kyiv Independent. Repeated warnings and strikes extended the disruption beyond the overnight attack window.

A Russian Shahed unmanned combat aerial vehicle in flight.
Russian forces have been using Shahed-based drones, designed by Iran, to attack Ukraine.

The reported figures put jet-powered drones at more than 29% of the overnight total. That represents a substantial share of this attack, although a single night’s figures cannot establish how quickly Russia is increasing their use.

Public technical disclosures offer context for the threat. In September 2025, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, HUR, published a component breakdown and three-dimensional model of the Russian Geran-3, a counterpart to Iran’s jet-powered Shahed-238.

HUR identified a Chinese Telefly JT80 turbojet engine and reported speeds of 300–370 kilometers per hour, with an estimated operational range of up to 1,000 kilometers. Those specifications are Ukrainian intelligence assessments. The attack report does not establish that all the jet-powered drones used on Sept. 25–26 were Geran-3s.

The operational concern is shorter reaction time. At a given detection distance, a faster approaching aircraft leaves defenders less time to track it and attempt an interception. Repeated attacks can compound that pressure by requiring crews to remain ready across successive alerts.

The overall defensive tally does not show how Ukraine performed against the jet-powered aircraft specifically. It combines different drone types and includes electronic suppression alongside physical destruction. It therefore cannot support a separate interception rate for the faster variants.

For open-source monitoring, the key question is whether this attack reflects a sustained change in Russia’s strike mix. Answering that requires comparable daily launch figures, dated wreckage imagery and identifiable engine or airframe components. Those records would help distinguish increased deployment from changes in how Ukrainian authorities classify and report incoming drones.

The available evidence supports a narrower conclusion: jet-powered drones were a significant component of this attack. Establishing an accelerating shift requires a series of observations over time.